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= OT Asset Visibility & Operational Awareness =
= Inverter Security Assessments & Lessons Learned =


[[File:OT Asset Visibility Dashboard.png|thumb|right|900px|Example OT Asset Visibility Platform]]
[[File:Inverter Assessment Architecture.png|thumb|right|900px|Representative inverter communications and connectivity assessment<ref>[https://msites.epri.com/spn/research/112046/security-design-architecture-review%3A-solar-inverters EPRI Security Design Architecture Review: Solar Inverters (3002029720)]</ref>]]


== Executive Summary ==
== Executive Summary ==


Operational Technology (OT) Asset Visibility platforms have become foundational capabilities for utility cybersecurity, operational resilience, and asset management programs. As industrial environments become increasingly connected, organizations require accurate visibility into assets, communications, software, and network behavior across generation, transmission, distribution, and critical infrastructure environments.
Recent assessment activities identified recurring cybersecurity and operational risks associated with inverter deployments, including undocumented communications capabilities, insecure default configurations, hidden connectivity, and limited asset visibility.<ref>[https://msites.epri.com/spn/research/112046/security-design-architecture-review%3A-solar-inverters EPRI Security Design Architecture Review: Solar Inverters (3002029720)]</ref>


Modern OT visibility platforms provide continuous asset discovery, protocol awareness, behavioral analysis, and integration with security operations tools. These capabilities help organizations improve situational awareness, reduce cybersecurity risk, and support operational decision-making.
As Inverter-Based Resources (IBRs) and Battery Energy Storage Systems (BESS) continue to expand across the electric grid, understanding device communications, vendor access pathways, and security configurations has become increasingly important for both cybersecurity and reliability programs.<ref>[https://top.epri.com/research-area/inverter-based-resources-and-grid-interconnection EPRI Inverter-Based Resources and Grid Interconnection Research Area]</ref>
 
Industry assessments have demonstrated that deployed systems may not always align with documented architectures or operational assumptions, highlighting the importance of validating technology deployments throughout the asset lifecycle.<ref>[https://www.epri.com/research/programs/112046/results/3002012753 EPRI Supply Chain Assessment Research Program]</ref>


{| class="wikitable"
{| class="wikitable"
|+ Why OT Asset Visibility Matters
|+ Why It Matters
|-
|-
! Area
! Area
! Business Value
! Potential Impact
|-
| Visibility
| Undocumented communications capabilities may reduce awareness of how assets communicate and operate.
|-
|-
| Cybersecurity
| Cybersecurity
| Identifies assets, communications, and potential security risks across OT environments.
| Default credentials, exposed services, and unmanaged access pathways increase cyber risk.
|-
|-
| Operations
| Reliability
| Provides visibility into critical systems, communications flows, and operational dependencies.
| Unverified configurations and unexpected connectivity may introduce operational uncertainty.
|-
|-
| Asset Management
| Supply Chain Assurance
| Supports inventory management, lifecycle planning, and modernization initiatives.
| Hidden components and communications pathways can complicate supplier validation and asset trust decisions.
|}
 
{| class="wikitable"
|+ Key Assessment Theme
|-
|-
| Incident Response
|
| Accelerates investigations through improved asset context and network awareness.
Assessment activities consistently demonstrate that organizations should validate hardware, communications pathways, software services, and security configurations through independent testing rather than relying exclusively on vendor documentation or deployment assumptions.<ref>[https://msites.epri.com/spn/research/112046/security-design-architecture-review%3A-solar-inverters EPRI Security Design Architecture Review: Solar Inverters (3002029720)]</ref>
|}
|}


----
----


== Industry Context ==
== Assessment Overview ==


Utilities continue integrating distributed energy resources (DERs), inverter-based resources (IBRs), intelligent electronic devices (IEDs), remote connectivity solutions, and cloud-enabled services throughout operational environments.
Assessment activities focused on understanding communications pathways, device configurations, software services, hardware components, and external connectivity associated with inverter deployments.<ref>[https://msites.epri.com/spn/research/112046/security-design-architecture-review%3A-solar-inverters EPRI Security Design Architecture Review: Solar Inverters (3002029720)]</ref>


As OT ecosystems become more interconnected and complex, maintaining an accurate inventory of assets, communications pathways, protocols, and software dependencies becomes increasingly important.<ref>[https://www.epri.com/research/products/000000003002027430 EPRI Defensible Network Architectures: Criteria for Secure OT Deployment in Power Systems (3002027430)]</ref>
The objective was not only to identify vulnerabilities, but also to validate assumptions regarding connectivity, architecture, vendor access, and operational behavior.<ref>[https://www.epri.com/research/products/000000003002012752 EPRI Technical Assessment Methodology (3002012752)]</ref>


EPRI cybersecurity research continues to emphasize understanding network architectures, external communications, and asset inventories as foundational components of both cybersecurity and operational resilience programs.<ref>[https://msites.epri.com/spn/research/112046/security-design-architecture-review%3A-solar-inverters EPRI Security Design Architecture Review: Solar Inverters (3002029720)]</ref>
Findings repeatedly demonstrated the importance of independent validation throughout procurement, commissioning, and operational lifecycle activities.
 
Unlike traditional IT environments, operational networks often contain specialized systems, proprietary protocols, legacy devices, and safety-critical processes that cannot be actively scanned without introducing operational risk. OT visibility platforms help address these challenges through passive monitoring and protocol-aware analytics.


----
----


== Core Capabilities ==
== Key Findings ==


=== Asset Discovery ===
=== Undocumented Communications Capabilities ===


OT visibility platforms use passive monitoring techniques to identify and inventory devices communicating across industrial networks without disrupting operations.
Recent EPRI assessments have highlighted the importance of understanding communications protocols, data flows, and connectivity that may not be fully understood or documented by system owners and operators.<ref>[https://msites.epri.com/spn/research/112046/security-design-architecture-review%3A-solar-inverters EPRI Security Design Architecture Review: Solar Inverters (3002029720)]</ref>


Commonly discovered assets include:
Examples observed during assessment activities included:


* Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs)
* Undocumented 868 MHz communications
* Human Machine Interfaces (HMIs)
* Undocumented 900 MHz communications
* Distributed Control Systems (DCS)
* Wireless interfaces not reflected within deployment documentation
* Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems
* Unexpected communications pathways
* Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs)
* Communications behavior not represented in architecture diagrams
* Protection relays
* Engineering workstations
* Historians
* OT servers and network infrastructure


'''Why It Matters'''
'''Why It Matters'''


Organizations cannot effectively secure assets they cannot identify. Comprehensive inventories provide the foundation for cybersecurity, compliance, vulnerability management, architecture reviews, and modernization initiatives.
Utilities frequently develop network architectures, monitoring strategies, and incident response plans based on expected communications behavior. Undocumented communications can create blind spots that reduce visibility and complicate operational awareness.


EPRI's Technical Assessment Methodology (TAM) highlights asset awareness and attack surface understanding as foundational activities for evaluating cybersecurity risks across operational environments.<ref>[https://www.epri.com/research/products/000000003002012752 EPRI Technical Assessment Methodology (3002012752)]</ref>
----
 
=== Asset Context & Intelligence ===
 
Modern platforms go beyond simple inventory management by providing operational context through protocol analysis, communications monitoring, and relationship mapping.
 
Examples include:
 
* Industrial protocol identification
* Communications flow analysis
* Firmware visibility
* Device relationship mapping
* Network dependency analysis
* Asset criticality classification
 
These capabilities help organizations understand how devices interact and support more effective risk prioritization.
 
=== Behavioral Visibility ===
 
OT visibility platforms establish baseline operational behavior by continuously monitoring communications between assets.
 
Behavioral analytics can identify:
 
* Unexpected communications
* Unauthorized devices
* Configuration changes
* Abnormal protocol behavior
* Potential cyber threats
 
Rather than relying solely on signature-based detection, organizations gain visibility into deviations from established operational patterns.


=== Security Operations Integration ===
=== Hidden Cellular Connectivity ===


Asset visibility platforms increasingly integrate with enterprise cybersecurity programs.
Assessment activities identified embedded cellular communications capabilities within inverter systems.


Common integrations include:
Examples included:


* Splunk
* Quectel BG95-M1 LTE modems
* Microsoft Sentinel
* SIM card-enabled communications modules
* IBM QRadar
* ESP32 microcontrollers supporting communications functions
* ServiceNow
* Devices attempting cellular communications
* Palo Alto Networks
* Cisco XDR
* CrowdStrike
* Microsoft Defender XDR


These integrations enable OT asset intelligence to support security operations centers (SOCs), incident response teams, threat hunting programs, and enterprise risk management activities.
The presence of embedded communications modules demonstrates the importance of validating hardware configurations and independently assessing communications capabilities rather than relying solely on deployment documentation.<ref>[https://www.epri.com/research/programs/112046/results/3002012753 EPRI Supply Chain Assessment Research Program]</ref>
 
----
 
== Operational & Cybersecurity Benefits ==


{| class="wikitable"
{| class="wikitable"
|+ Assessment Questions
|-
|-
! Capability
! Question
! Benefit
! Objective
|-
| Asset Inventory
| Establishes a comprehensive view of OT devices, software, and communications.
|-
| Protocol Awareness
| Improves visibility into industrial communications and operational dependencies.
|-
|-
| Risk Prioritization
| Does the device contain cellular hardware?
| Helps focus resources on critical systems and high-value assets.
| Validate communications capabilities.
|-
|-
| Threat Detection
| Is a SIM card installed?
| Identifies abnormal behavior and unauthorized activity.
| Determine whether external connectivity is enabled.
|-
|-
| Incident Response
| Can cellular functionality be disabled?
| Improves investigation speed and asset understanding.
| Reduce unnecessary attack surface.
|-
|-
| Compliance Support
| Is connectivity documented by the vendor?
| Assists with asset identification, security reviews, and audit readiness.
| Verify deployment assumptions.
|}
|}
'''Why It Matters'''
Cellular connectivity may introduce communications pathways that bypass traditional network monitoring, segmentation, and access control mechanisms. Organizations should understand where cellular communications exist, who manages connectivity, and whether functionality is required for operational purposes.


----
----


== OT Visibility Platform Landscape ==
=== Configuration Weaknesses ===


Several OT visibility platforms have become widely adopted across utility, industrial, manufacturing, and critical infrastructure sectors.
Configuration reviews identified several conditions commonly associated with increased cyber risk and expanded attack surfaces.<ref>[https://www.epri.com/research/products/000000003002012752 EPRI Technical Assessment Methodology (3002012752)]</ref>


{| class="wikitable"
Examples included:
|+ Representative OT Asset Visibility Platforms
|-
! Platform
! Primary Strengths
! Common Utility Use Cases
|-
| '''Nozomi Networks'''
| Deep OT protocol visibility, asset discovery, anomaly detection, vulnerability identification
| Substations, generation facilities, transmission environments, control center monitoring
|-
| '''Dragos'''
| Asset inventory, ICS threat detection, threat intelligence, incident response support
| OT security operations, threat hunting, industrial cyber defense
|-
| '''Claroty'''
| Asset discovery, exposure management, risk analysis, secure remote access
| Enterprise OT visibility and asset management programs
|-
| '''Microsoft Defender for IoT'''
| Agentless monitoring and strong integration with Microsoft security products
| Organizations utilizing Microsoft Sentinel, Defender XDR, and Azure services
|-
| '''Armis'''
| Agentless asset visibility, IT/OT convergence, vulnerability and exposure management
| Enterprise-wide visibility across IT, OT, IoT, and connected devices
|}


''Inclusion in this table does not imply endorsement. Organizations should evaluate solutions based on operational requirements, cybersecurity objectives, architecture constraints, and integration needs.''
* Default passwords remaining enabled
* SSH services enabled
* Open MongoDB services
* Open NTP services
* External DNS configurations
* Unnecessary management interfaces


=== Selection Considerations ===
'''Why It Matters'''


Organizations commonly evaluate OT visibility platforms based on:
Many of these findings can be addressed through secure deployment standards, commissioning procedures, and security validation activities. However, they continue to be observed across both new and existing deployments.


* OT protocol coverage (DNP3, IEC 61850, Modbus, OPC, ICCP, Ethernet/IP, Profinet)
Organizations should assume default configurations require review and hardening rather than assuming systems are delivered securely configured.
* Passive monitoring capabilities
* Integration with existing SIEM and SOC workflows
* Asset inventory accuracy
* Threat detection maturity
* Scalability across substations and operational sites
* Cloud versus on-premises deployment requirements


----
----


== Utility Use Cases ==
== Lessons Learned ==
 
=== Trust Must Be Verified ===
 
Manufacturer documentation, deployment assumptions, and expected architectures should be independently validated through technical assessment activities.
 
EPRI assessment methodologies emphasize understanding architecture, communications pathways, and attack surfaces as part of secure deployment reviews.<ref>[https://www.epri.com/research/products/000000003002012752 EPRI Technical Assessment Methodology (3002012752)]</ref>


=== Asset Inventory Modernization ===
The existence of undocumented hardware, communications capabilities, and software services demonstrates the importance of verification-based security programs.


Many organizations begin OT visibility initiatives to establish accurate and continuously updated inventories across substations, generation facilities, control centers, battery energy storage systems, and field operations.
=== Visibility Is Foundational ===


=== Cybersecurity Monitoring ===
Organizations cannot effectively secure technologies they cannot fully inventory or observe.


Asset context enhances threat detection and incident response by helping analysts understand device roles, communications pathways, and operational importance.
Maintaining visibility into assets, protocols, communications paths, firmware versions, and external connectivity should be considered a foundational cybersecurity capability.<ref>[https://www.epri.com/research/products/000000003002027430 EPRI Defensible Network Architectures: Criteria for Secure OT Deployment in Power Systems (3002027430)]</ref>


=== Vulnerability & Risk Management ===
=== Secure Configuration Matters ===


Visibility platforms help organizations identify vulnerable devices, unsupported operating systems, legacy technologies, outdated firmware, and insecure communications.
Default credentials, exposed management services, and unnecessary communications pathways continue to represent common sources of cyber risk.


=== Architecture & Communications Reviews ===
Security controls should be reviewed and validated during deployment rather than deferred until systems are operational.


EPRI assessments increasingly emphasize understanding communications pathways, protocol usage, and external connectivity as part of secure-by-design deployment approaches.<ref>[https://msites.epri.com/spn/research/112046/security-design-architecture-review%3A-solar-inverters EPRI Security Design Architecture Review: Solar Inverters (3002029720)]</ref>
=== Lifecycle Risk Extends Beyond Deployment ===


=== Operational Resilience ===
Supply chain risk does not end after procurement.


Understanding dependencies between devices and systems enables more effective planning, troubleshooting, maintenance, recovery, and operational decision-making.
Organizations should continuously evaluate firmware, software, communications pathways, and vendor access throughout the lifecycle of deployed technologies.<ref>[https://www.epri.com/research/programs/112046/results/3002012753 EPRI Supply Chain Assessment Research Program]</ref>


----
----


== Recommended Practices ==
== Recommended Practices ==
Industry guidance increasingly emphasizes secure-by-design deployment approaches, architecture validation, communications awareness, and continuous monitoring throughout the asset lifecycle.<ref>[https://www.epri.com/research/products/000000003002027430 EPRI Defensible Network Architectures: Criteria for Secure OT Deployment in Power Systems (3002027430)]</ref>


{| class="wikitable"
{| class="wikitable"
|+ Recommended Actions
|-
|-
! Focus Area
! Focus Area
! Recommended Actions
! Recommended Practices
|-
|-
| Discovery
| Asset Validation
| Deploy passive sensors to establish visibility without disrupting operational processes.
| Conduct physical inspections and validate deployed hardware inventories.
|-
|-
| Inventory
| Wireless Assessment
| Develop and maintain complete inventories of OT assets, firmware, software, and communications pathways.
| Perform spectrum analysis and identify undocumented wireless communications.
|-
|-
| Architecture
| Secure Configuration
| Document trust boundaries, external connectivity, and protocol dependencies.
| Remove default credentials, disable unnecessary services, and implement secure baselines.
|-
|-
| Integration
| Architecture Review
| Integrate OT telemetry into SIEM, SOC, and incident response platforms.
| Validate communications pathways and review remote-access capabilities.
|-
|-
| Monitoring
| Monitoring
| Establish behavioral baselines and continuously monitor for abnormal activity.
| Deploy network monitoring, OT visibility platforms, IDS capabilities, and continuous asset discovery.
|-
|-
| Governance
| Security Testing
| Incorporate OT visibility into cybersecurity, risk management, compliance, and asset management programs.
| Conduct periodic penetration testing, red-team exercises, and architecture assessments.
|}
|}


----
----


== Industry Trends ==
== Questions for Utilities ==


Several trends continue shaping the OT visibility market and broader utility cybersecurity landscape.
Organizations evaluating inverter deployments should consider the following:
 
{| class="wikitable"
|+ Market Direction
|-
! Trend
! Description
|-
| IT/OT Convergence
| Increased visibility across enterprise and operational environments.
|-
| Exposure Management
| Prioritization of exploitable vulnerabilities and operational risks.
|-
| AI-Assisted Analysis
| Automated asset classification, alert triage, and risk identification.
|-
| Secure Remote Access
| Enhanced management and monitoring of vendor and contractor connectivity.
|-
| Grid Modernization
| Greater visibility requirements resulting from DER, IBR, and BESS deployments.
|-
| Digital Twins
| Enhanced modeling of operational assets and system interdependencies.
|}


As utilities deploy increasing numbers of inverter-based resources, intelligent electronic devices, and connected operational technologies, maintaining accurate visibility into assets, communications, and dependencies is becoming a foundational requirement for cybersecurity, resilience, and operational excellence.<ref>[https://top.epri.com/research-area/inverter-based-resources-and-grid-interconnection EPRI Inverter-Based Resources and Grid Interconnection Research Area]</ref>
* Do deployed assets match vendor documentation?
* Are all communications pathways understood and documented?
* Can wireless and cellular capabilities be independently validated?
* Are vendor remote-access capabilities required and controlled?
* Are secure configuration standards consistently applied?
* Are firmware versions regularly reviewed and updated?
* Can unexpected communications behavior be detected and investigated?


----
----
Line 281: Line 209:
== EPRI Resources ==
== EPRI Resources ==


* [https://msites.epri.com/spn/research/112046/security-design-architecture-review%3A-solar-inverters EPRI Security Design Architecture Review: Solar Inverters (3002029720)]
* [https://www.epri.com/research/programs/112046/results/3002012753 EPRI Supply Chain Assessment Research Program]
* [https://www.epri.com/research/products/000000003002012752 EPRI Technical Assessment Methodology (3002012752)]
* [https://www.epri.com/research/products/000000003002027430 EPRI Defensible Network Architectures: Criteria for Secure OT Deployment in Power Systems (3002027430)]
* [https://www.epri.com/research/products/000000003002027430 EPRI Defensible Network Architectures: Criteria for Secure OT Deployment in Power Systems (3002027430)]
* [https://www.epri.com/research/products/000000003002012752 EPRI Technical Assessment Methodology (3002012752)]
* [https://msites.epri.com/spn/research/112046/security-design-architecture-review%3A-solar-inverters EPRI Security Design Architecture Review: Solar Inverters (3002029720)]
* [https://top.epri.com/research-area/inverter-based-resources-and-grid-interconnection EPRI Inverter-Based Resources and Grid Interconnection Research Area]
* [https://top.epri.com/research-area/inverter-based-resources-and-grid-interconnection EPRI Inverter-Based Resources and Grid Interconnection Research Area]


== Related Topics ==
== Related Topics ==


* Inverter-Based Resources (IBRs)
* Battery Energy Storage Systems (BESS)
* Supply Chain Security
* OT Asset Visibility
* Operational Technology (OT) Security
* Operational Technology (OT) Security
* Industrial Control Systems (ICS)
* Secure Architecture Reviews
* SCADA Security
* Grid Modernization
* Asset Management
* Network Monitoring & Detection
* Security Operations Centers (SOC)
* Supply Chain Risk Management
* Industrial Threat Detection
* Network Architecture
* Zero Trust Architecture
* Cyber-Informed Engineering
* Cyber-Informed Engineering
* Digital Twins
* Inverter-Based Resources (IBRs)
* Battery Energy Storage Systems (BESS)

Revision as of 04:06, 5 November 2026

Inverter Security Assessments & Lessons Learned

File:Inverter Assessment Architecture.png
Representative inverter communications and connectivity assessment[1]

Executive Summary

Recent assessment activities identified recurring cybersecurity and operational risks associated with inverter deployments, including undocumented communications capabilities, insecure default configurations, hidden connectivity, and limited asset visibility.[2]

As Inverter-Based Resources (IBRs) and Battery Energy Storage Systems (BESS) continue to expand across the electric grid, understanding device communications, vendor access pathways, and security configurations has become increasingly important for both cybersecurity and reliability programs.[3]

Industry assessments have demonstrated that deployed systems may not always align with documented architectures or operational assumptions, highlighting the importance of validating technology deployments throughout the asset lifecycle.[4]

Why It Matters
Area Potential Impact
Visibility Undocumented communications capabilities may reduce awareness of how assets communicate and operate.
Cybersecurity Default credentials, exposed services, and unmanaged access pathways increase cyber risk.
Reliability Unverified configurations and unexpected connectivity may introduce operational uncertainty.
Supply Chain Assurance Hidden components and communications pathways can complicate supplier validation and asset trust decisions.
Key Assessment Theme

Assessment activities consistently demonstrate that organizations should validate hardware, communications pathways, software services, and security configurations through independent testing rather than relying exclusively on vendor documentation or deployment assumptions.[5]

Assessment Overview

Assessment activities focused on understanding communications pathways, device configurations, software services, hardware components, and external connectivity associated with inverter deployments.[6]

The objective was not only to identify vulnerabilities, but also to validate assumptions regarding connectivity, architecture, vendor access, and operational behavior.[7]

Findings repeatedly demonstrated the importance of independent validation throughout procurement, commissioning, and operational lifecycle activities.

Key Findings

Undocumented Communications Capabilities

Recent EPRI assessments have highlighted the importance of understanding communications protocols, data flows, and connectivity that may not be fully understood or documented by system owners and operators.[8]

Examples observed during assessment activities included:

  • Undocumented 868 MHz communications
  • Undocumented 900 MHz communications
  • Wireless interfaces not reflected within deployment documentation
  • Unexpected communications pathways
  • Communications behavior not represented in architecture diagrams

Why It Matters

Utilities frequently develop network architectures, monitoring strategies, and incident response plans based on expected communications behavior. Undocumented communications can create blind spots that reduce visibility and complicate operational awareness.

Hidden Cellular Connectivity

Assessment activities identified embedded cellular communications capabilities within inverter systems.

Examples included:

  • Quectel BG95-M1 LTE modems
  • SIM card-enabled communications modules
  • ESP32 microcontrollers supporting communications functions
  • Devices attempting cellular communications

The presence of embedded communications modules demonstrates the importance of validating hardware configurations and independently assessing communications capabilities rather than relying solely on deployment documentation.[9]

Assessment Questions
Question Objective
Does the device contain cellular hardware? Validate communications capabilities.
Is a SIM card installed? Determine whether external connectivity is enabled.
Can cellular functionality be disabled? Reduce unnecessary attack surface.
Is connectivity documented by the vendor? Verify deployment assumptions.

Why It Matters

Cellular connectivity may introduce communications pathways that bypass traditional network monitoring, segmentation, and access control mechanisms. Organizations should understand where cellular communications exist, who manages connectivity, and whether functionality is required for operational purposes.

Configuration Weaknesses

Configuration reviews identified several conditions commonly associated with increased cyber risk and expanded attack surfaces.[10]

Examples included:

  • Default passwords remaining enabled
  • SSH services enabled
  • Open MongoDB services
  • Open NTP services
  • External DNS configurations
  • Unnecessary management interfaces

Why It Matters

Many of these findings can be addressed through secure deployment standards, commissioning procedures, and security validation activities. However, they continue to be observed across both new and existing deployments.

Organizations should assume default configurations require review and hardening rather than assuming systems are delivered securely configured.

Lessons Learned

Trust Must Be Verified

Manufacturer documentation, deployment assumptions, and expected architectures should be independently validated through technical assessment activities.

EPRI assessment methodologies emphasize understanding architecture, communications pathways, and attack surfaces as part of secure deployment reviews.[11]

The existence of undocumented hardware, communications capabilities, and software services demonstrates the importance of verification-based security programs.

Visibility Is Foundational

Organizations cannot effectively secure technologies they cannot fully inventory or observe.

Maintaining visibility into assets, protocols, communications paths, firmware versions, and external connectivity should be considered a foundational cybersecurity capability.[12]

Secure Configuration Matters

Default credentials, exposed management services, and unnecessary communications pathways continue to represent common sources of cyber risk.

Security controls should be reviewed and validated during deployment rather than deferred until systems are operational.

Lifecycle Risk Extends Beyond Deployment

Supply chain risk does not end after procurement.

Organizations should continuously evaluate firmware, software, communications pathways, and vendor access throughout the lifecycle of deployed technologies.[13]

Recommended Practices

Industry guidance increasingly emphasizes secure-by-design deployment approaches, architecture validation, communications awareness, and continuous monitoring throughout the asset lifecycle.[14]

Recommended Actions
Focus Area Recommended Practices
Asset Validation Conduct physical inspections and validate deployed hardware inventories.
Wireless Assessment Perform spectrum analysis and identify undocumented wireless communications.
Secure Configuration Remove default credentials, disable unnecessary services, and implement secure baselines.
Architecture Review Validate communications pathways and review remote-access capabilities.
Monitoring Deploy network monitoring, OT visibility platforms, IDS capabilities, and continuous asset discovery.
Security Testing Conduct periodic penetration testing, red-team exercises, and architecture assessments.

Questions for Utilities

Organizations evaluating inverter deployments should consider the following:

  • Do deployed assets match vendor documentation?
  • Are all communications pathways understood and documented?
  • Can wireless and cellular capabilities be independently validated?
  • Are vendor remote-access capabilities required and controlled?
  • Are secure configuration standards consistently applied?
  • Are firmware versions regularly reviewed and updated?
  • Can unexpected communications behavior be detected and investigated?

References

  1. ↑ EPRI Security Design Architecture Review: Solar Inverters (3002029720)
  2. ↑ EPRI Security Design Architecture Review: Solar Inverters (3002029720)
  3. ↑ EPRI Inverter-Based Resources and Grid Interconnection Research Area
  4. ↑ EPRI Supply Chain Assessment Research Program
  5. ↑ EPRI Security Design Architecture Review: Solar Inverters (3002029720)
  6. ↑ EPRI Security Design Architecture Review: Solar Inverters (3002029720)
  7. ↑ EPRI Technical Assessment Methodology (3002012752)
  8. ↑ EPRI Security Design Architecture Review: Solar Inverters (3002029720)
  9. ↑ EPRI Supply Chain Assessment Research Program
  10. ↑ EPRI Technical Assessment Methodology (3002012752)
  11. ↑ EPRI Technical Assessment Methodology (3002012752)
  12. ↑ EPRI Defensible Network Architectures: Criteria for Secure OT Deployment in Power Systems (3002027430)
  13. ↑ EPRI Supply Chain Assessment Research Program
  14. ↑ EPRI Defensible Network Architectures: Criteria for Secure OT Deployment in Power Systems (3002027430)

EPRI Resources

Related Topics

  • Inverter-Based Resources (IBRs)
  • Battery Energy Storage Systems (BESS)
  • Supply Chain Security
  • OT Asset Visibility
  • Operational Technology (OT) Security
  • Secure Architecture Reviews
  • Grid Modernization
  • Network Monitoring & Detection
  • Supply Chain Risk Management
  • Cyber-Informed Engineering
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